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Abstract 
We investigate whether performance persistence exists on the Swedish market for equity 
based mutual funds for the years 1992 – 2011. We test for one-year persistence for the risk-
neutral returns for eight fund categories. The method includes both an autoregression of 
present returns on past returns and a cross product ratio test. The results suggest that 
performance persistent exists on the Swedish market. The main significant evidence is found 
for funds investing in Sweden, Europe and globally. The persistency found is most prevalent 
for the period spanning from 2000 to 2010. 
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1 Introduction 
The Swedish market for mutual funds has seen a great increase over the last 30 years. Even 
though the first Swedish fund equivalent of what we today call a mutual fund was started in 
1958 it was not until 1984 with the introduction of the “Allemansfond” (SFS 1997:465) that 
the Swedish market for mutual funds saw a more intense increase (SIFA, 2009). From a value 
of 65 billion SEK in 1986 the Swedish market for mutual funds amounts to 1 800 billion SEK 
by the end of 2011 with equity funds making up for half of the 1800 billion SEK (SIFA, 
2012). 
Given the size of the Swedish mutual fund market it might be difficult to get a sufficient 
overview. From an investor’s point of view it may seem rational to base ones decision on 
what fund to invest in on historical returns. For instance the Morningstar ratings of mutual 
funds are based on historical returns. Though for the historical return of a mutual fund to be a 
valid investment criterion, persistence in performance must exist from a historical time period 
to a later one.  
Since 1986 only three studies on performance persistence have been made on the Swedish 
market with the latest one including data up until 2006. Whereas Dahlqvist, Engström and 
Söderlind (2000) found no evidence of performance persistence for equity based mutual 
funds, Jern (2002) and Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) did. One should, however, point 
out that the evidence found in the latter studies was not mainly for the same fund categories. 
Given the great increase of the Swedish market for mutual funds, the somewhat mixed results 
of the earlier studies and that data from five more years have become available we consider 
the area attractive for further studies. 
Thus, the question we try to answer is if performance persistence does exist on the Swedish 
market for equity based mutual funds. Do certain funds consistently perform better than 
others? 
In more formal words the hypothesis tested and its corresponding null hypothesis can be 
stated as follows: 
- H0: Performance persistence does not exist on the Swedish market for equity based 
mutual funds. 
- H1: Performance persistence exists on the Swedish market for equity based mutual 
funds. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is based on the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 
1965). In short, an efficient market can be described as a market in which prices always 
reflect all relevant information. On a market with performance persistence prices are 
predictable. Predictability in prices means that all available information is not reflected in 
prices and thus that the market is not efficient given that only rational investors exist. 
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This study studies performance data up until 2011 including five more years of newer data 
compared to the latest study of performance persistence on the Swedish market (Garbalinska 
& Gustafsson, 2007). We have no reason to believe that the market characteristics have 
changed to such a degree since the latest study that it will affect the results of our study. We 
expect our results to be in line with earlier study by Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) and 
Jern (2002) thus show evidence of performance persistence in Swedish equity mutual funds. 
The methodology of this study includes both parametric and non-parametric methods. Firstly 
a sample of Swedish equity based mutual funds, with data spanning from 1992 to 2011, was 
taken and every fund was categorized depending on its choice of geographical investment 
region. A risk-neutral performance measure was then calculated for every fund and year. 
Tests were then made in order to determine if significant persistence in performance exists 
from one year to the next one for each category and year. The parametric method used was a 
regression of the funds’ performance in one category in one year on the performance the 
previous year. The non-parametric method used was the cross product ratio test where one 
categorizes the funds in each category every year depending on whether it either over-perform 
or under-perform two years in a row or show negative relationship in performance over the 
two years. A statistic is then calculated and the significance of this statistic is tested. 
The theory essential of the thesis and a review of previous research are presented in sections 2 
and 3 respectively. A detailed description of the methodology used can be found in section 4, 
an overview of the data used is presented in section 5 whereas the results and the analysis can 
be found in sections 5 and 6 respectively. 
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2 Theory 
The theoretical foundation of this thesis is based on the efficient market hypothesis (EMH). 
Even though several theories similar to the EMH have been put forward in previous years, it 
was not until 1965 that an efficient market was firstly defined in literature. It was Fama 
(1965) who defined it and an efficient market is subject to three basic assumptions: 
1. Relevant information is available and costless to all market participants.  
2. On the market a large number of profit maximizing rational investors who compete 
against each other exist. 
3. If irrational investors exist on the market their trade does not affect prices. This is due 
to the fact that the trade of irrational investors is assumed to be purely random and that 
the effect on prices can thus be cancelled out. If the trade of those investors is not 
random but correlated rational arbitrageurs quickly eliminate those effects leaving 
prices unaffected.1 
 
In short an efficient market can be described as a market in which prices always reflect 
relevant information. 
There are three sub-hypothesises to the general efficient market hypothesis all depending on 
what one include in the term “relevant information”. 
The weak form of the EMH assumes that prices reflect historical market data such as prices 
and trading volumes. Given this assumption it is impossible for an investor to beat the current 
market by analysing historical market data. Prices have already adjusted. It is though still 
possible to achieve excess returns using fundamental analysis and inside information. 
The semi-strong form of the EMH assumes that prices reflect all publicly available 
information including fundamental data making it impossible to achieve excess returns using 
a fundamental analysis in contrast to the weak form. 
Finally the strong form of EMH, the most extreme of the three assumptions, assumes that 
prices reflect all relevant information irrespective of whether the information is considered to 
be public or insider information. Given that prices, in the context of the strong form of EMH, 
already reflect all relevant information one cannot achieve excess returns using a fundamental 
analysis or insider information. 
  
                                                 
1 Some question marks have though been raised regarding the view of irrational investors and arbitrageurs. 
Rational arbitrageurs may experience unexpected losses given that irrational investors may continue acting 
irrational turning the expected profit for the arbitrageur into an unexpected loss. This may make arbitrageurs 
hesitate when it comes to exploiting existing arbitrage opportunities (De Long et al, 1990).   
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Looking at markets today, they are not always aligned with the efficient market hypothesis. 
Anomalies to the efficient market hypothesis have been seen. Thaler (1999) listed many of 
them and we list some of his findings: 
- If the EMH holds trading should only occur when new public information is available 
or when investors need to liquidate. Though trading activity in shares is often high 
irrespectively of the fact that no new information is available or that no obvious reason 
to liquidation is to be seen. 
- Volatility in share prices is too high given no change in future dividend expectations. 
- Different measures, such as the earnings-price ratio, can be used as good predictors for 
future winners. 
 
Academics have found it easier to find anomalies from EMH than explaining them. As of 
today, academics are divided into two opposing sides when it comes to explaining the 
anomalies observed. 
The behaviourists try to explain the deviations from efficient markets by the shortcomings of 
investors. They claim that shortcomings in the cognitive ability of investors make them take 
irrational decisions. This makes the assumption of rational investors fail and thus the efficient 
market hypothesis itself (Yalçin, 2010). 
One the other side we find Fama and French (1988) arguing that anomalies can be explained 
by either chance or asset pricing models overreacting to new information. Fama and French 
also argue that long-term anomalies disappear if one makes reasonable changes to the 
methods used to measure anomalies. 
The relevant form of the EMH to this thesis is the weak form. As stated above one should not, 
according to the weak form of the EMH, be able predict future returns from historical market 
data. Thus finding evidence of prevalent performance persistence will thus reject the weak 
form of the EMH since one then can predict future returns. 
In terms of linking this thesis to the weak form of the EMH an assumption can be made. We 
want allow there to be irrational investors without automatically failing the EMH for rational 
investors. This is true given that shorting of funds is not possible. We define an irrational 
investor as an investor who does not evaluate his or her investment appropriately based on 
relevant information, for the weak form of the EMH, historical market data. If performance 
persistence can be derived from underperforming funds keep underperforming, but no 
consistent over performing funds, this persistence may be subject to irrational investors. One 
may not want to reject the EMH in this scenario since the market for rational investors is still 
effective, i.e. investors cannot retrieve excess returns from analysing historical data. 
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3 Review of Previous Research 
The history of performance persistence testing of mutual funds is soon to reach its 50th 
birthday. Even though the first studies on performance persistence could not demonstrate any 
evidence of persistence later studies have come to contradict or at least complicate the early 
conclusions. 
Roughly speaking, tests on performance persistence can be divided into two categories, non-
parametric and parametric. Whereas parametric tests require an assumption to be made about 
the distribution of the data no such assumption is needed to be made performing a non-
parametric test. Thus, non-parametric tests are widely used when a specific assumption of the 
distribution of the data cannot be made. 
A common parametric method testing for performance persistence is an autoregression of the 
performance in time period t on the performance in time period t-1. Common non-parametric 
tests include the cross-product ratio test, Spearman’s rank correlation and Kolomogorov-
Smirnov tests (Garbalinska & Gustafsson, 2007). 
Modern studies on performance persistence test whether persistence does exist given relevant 
fund-specific attributes. Finding evidence of such persistence supports the hypothesis of 
existing market timing skills of fund managers. 
The first studies on performance persistence were made by Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) 
that studied US fund data from the 1940s to the 1960s. Sharpe finds evidence of significant 
persistence in performance whilst Jensen does not. In his study Jensen use the so called 
Jensen’s Alpha. Using this method one can calculate the risk-adjusted performance taking into 
account the relative risk of the fund to the index. Later studies by Dunn and Thiesen (1983) 
study US fund returns from 1974 to 1988, and Carlson (1970) study US fund returns from 
1948 to 1967, supports the conclusion that past performance has no influence on future 
performance. Carlson (1970) also notes that the conclusion about whether funds beat the 
market or not is highly dependent on the choice of market proxy and time period. 
The early 1990s saw several studies supporting the hypothesis of existing performance 
persistence. Those include Hendricks, Patel and Zeckenhauser (1993), Goetzmann and 
Ibbotson (1994), Shukla and Trzinka (1994) and Brown and Goetzmann (1995). Though one 
should take into account that the studies made in the early 1990s were made on newer data 
compared to the other studies mentioned above. 
The study presented by Hendricks et al. (1993) was a response to criticism received by 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992). Brown et al. show that the existence of 
survivorship bias in the data has a significant effect on the conclusions about the performance 
persistence. Other studies have though finds that survivorship bias has no effect on the 
performance persistence. Among those Elton, Gruber, Das and Hlavka (1993). 
Hendricks et al. (1993) use quarterly data and finds evidence of performance persistence with 
persistence peaking at a one year evaluation period. 
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Researchers are not united behind one theory for the reason of the existence of survivorship 
bias. One view is expressed by Grinblatt and Titman (1992). The idea is that a fund that is not 
performing considerably well is more likely to be closed or merged with another better 
performing fund. Thus only including surviving funds for a time period may end up with one 
exaggerating the existence of significant performance persistence. Though this interpretation 
needs an assumption of market efficiency to hold. Given no market efficiency 
underperforming funds will not be closed. 
Later studies have tried to explain the performance persistence found by other factors and 
have succeed to some extent. Carhart (1997) finds that the performance persistence found by 
Hendricks et al. (1993) could almost completely be explained by other factors. The 
performance persistence of the well performing funds is mostly driven by a momentum 
strategy followed by those funds. This momentum strategy (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993) 
consists of buying stocks that have performed well in the past and sell stocks which have not 
performed well in the past. Carhart (1997) can however not explain the persistence in 
underperformance by the worst performing funds meaning that the only evidence for 
performance persistence is found for the worst performing funds. Carhart (1997) concludes 
that his results “do not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio 
managers”. 
Looking at more recent studies the results are still somewhat contradictory. Whereas 
Avramov and Wermers (2006) find some evidence of performance persistence Fama and 
French (2008) do not. 
Most early studies on performance persistence were made by US scholars and it is not until 
recently that studies on the Swedish market have been made. To our knowledge only three 
previous studies on the Swedish market for mutual funds have been made. 
Dahlqvist, Engström and Söderlind (2000) studied Swedish mutual funds returns 1993-1997 
and used Jensen’s alpha as their performance measure. In order to compute the alphas they 
ran a regression on the returns of the funds on several different benchmark assets. They then 
used a cross-sectional analysis to evaluate the funds given fund-specific attributes such as 
fund size, fee structure, trading activity and past performance.  They only find evidence of 
performance persistence for money market funds. 
Jern (2002) studied Swedish mutual funds returns between 1992 and 2001. Jern ran a 
regression of present alphas on previous alphas and finds evidence of one-year performance 
persistence for funds categorized as either Asian, North American or global and two-year 
persistence only for funds categorized as Asian.  
Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) studied Swedish mutual funds from 1993 to 2006. Using 
parametric and non-parametric methods they analysed both raw and abnormal returns and 
found evidence of one-year performance persistence for funds investing in Sweden, Europe, 
Eastern Europe and globally. 
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Of the three we consider the study of Dahlqvist et al. to be the most extensive one. Dahlqvist 
et al. take into account fund-specific attributes, besides relative risk of the fund to its index 
and investment area when testing for persistency. Thus getting the closest to a test whether 
skilful fund managers do exist on the specific market. Even though some of the fund-specific 
attributes may be down to the fund manager to decide upon. 
To summarize, in general the early studies of performance persistence do not find any 
evidence of existing persistence in mutual funds. Later studies have introduced the importance 
of survivorship bias in the data even though the effect of its existence on the conclusions 
about the performance persistence is debatable. Several studies in the early 1990s find 
evidence of existing performance persistence. Though later studies have come to conclude 
that some of these results could be explained by the fund following a specific strategy and not 
by market timing skills of the fund manager. The Swedish market is relatively unexplored and 
only a few studies have been done on the subject. The conclusions drawn in those studies are 
mixed and there is no evident view on whether performance persistence exists on the Swedish 
market or not. 
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4 Methodology 
As mentioned in the literature review there are two main methods testing for performance 
persistence, parametric and non-parametric methods. Due to insecurity whether our data could 
be assumed to follow a normal distribution we have chosen to perform both a parametric and 
a non-parametric test. 
As our parametric test we have chosen to use an autoregression of the performance in time 
period t on the performance an earlier time period. 
Our choice of non-parametric test fell on the cross product ratio test. 
Doing the tests we are controlling for the choice of geographical investment region for the 
different funds. Thus we controlled if there is any difference in persistence depending on the 
choice of geographical investment region. 
We also choose to only test for one-year persistence. Looking at previous studies of 
performance persistence tests on persistence for different lengths of time periods have been 
made. Though tests of persistence on a one-year time period is one of the most common time 
periods used and one of the most common time periods where one has found persistence in 
performance. 
The gathered data has been compiled in Microsoft Excel. Statistical calculations and 
estimations of regression models are done using Stata 12. 
One must also decide on what measure of performance to perform the tests on. What measure 
of performance is the right one to use? Previous studies’ tests have been performed on both 
raw returns and risk-neutral measures of the raw returns. To limit ourselves we choose to 
perform our test only on a risk-neutral measure of the raw returns and our choice of measure 
is the Jensen’s Alpha. 
Our choice of methodology is similar to the one used by Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007). 
In contrast to Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) we have chosen to study a longer time 
period spanning from 1992 to 2011 and to test for performance persistence for every year 
compared to Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) that tested for performance persistence for 
every second year on data from 1993 to 2006. 
Our study on performance persistence only includes tests on a risk-neutral performance 
measure. One should also note that our study is made on a sample affected by survivorship 
bias which may affect our results. 
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4.1 Performance Measure 
Jensen’s Alpha, firstly developed by Jensen (1968), has been used in several previous studies 
on performance persistence. The Alphas are estimated for each fund and subperiod using a 
regression model. The model looks as follows: 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖𝑚 × (𝑟𝑚𝑡 − 𝑟𝑓𝑡)𝑖𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 
where 
𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the raw return for fund i in the time period t,  
𝑟𝑓𝑡 is the risk-free rate f in the time period t, 
𝛽𝑖𝑚 is the relative volatility of fund i to its benchmark index m,  
𝑟𝑚𝑡 is the raw return for benchmark index m in the time period t and  
𝛼𝑖𝑡 is the Jensen’s Alpha for fund i in the time period t. 
𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. 
Jensen’s Alpha tells us if the fund in question has under- or overperformed relatively to its 
benchmark index and its relative riskiness to its benchmark index. A positive Jensen’s Alpha 
indicates that the fund beats the benchmark index while a negative Jensen’s Alpha indicates 
that the fund gets beaten by the benchmark index for time period t. A value of zero for 
Jensen’s Alpha suggests that the fund in question has performed equally well as the 
benchmark index. 
The betas are allowed to vary yearly in order to catch the effect of a changed fund strategy 
affecting the risk level of a fund. Given the considerably high average goodness of fit 
measures achieved for the different regions (see table C2 in the appendix), with North 
America being the exception, we argue that the Jensen’s Alphas are to be considered reliable 
since the risk is reflected in the benchmark to a large degree. 
4.2 Performance Persistence Measures 
4.2.1 Autoregression 
Running an autoregression is one of the two tests we run testing for performance persistence. 
Our estimated regression model looks as follows (Jern, 2002) 
𝛼𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛼𝑡−1 + 𝜖,  
where 𝛼𝑡 is the risk-neutral return (in our case Jensen’s Alpha) in period t, 𝛼𝑡−1 is the risk-
neutral return in the previous time period and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. Our sample was split into 
seven geographical regions depending upon the funds choice of geographical investment area. 
We then run a regression on the return data for every two consecutive years for each 
geographical region. A positive value on the coefficient β1 then means that persistence does 
exist for the risk-neutral returns over the two years in that category. A negative value on the 
coefficient β1 suggests that there is a negative relationship whilst a β1 value equal to zero 
means that the there is no existing relationship between the risk-neutral returns in the two 
periods. 
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We also run an autoregression for the full period, spanning from 1992-2011, in order to test 
for performance persistence for this period. In practice this means that a regression is run of 
all the alphas in one category on the corresponding alphas the previous year. 
To test whether the coefficient β1 is significant or not we run a significance test assuming 
normal distribution of the regression errors. In line with previous studies on performance 
persistence we use a significance level of five per cent. 
4.2.2 Cross Product Ratio Test 
Due to uncertainty about whether the data is normally distributed we have also chosen to 
perform a non-parametric test, more specifically the cross product ratio test (Brown and 
Goetzmann, 2005). This test does not take into account the magnitude of the positive or 
negative performance of a fund a given year. It solely considers whether the fund is a winner 
or a loser. 
A fund is categorised as a winner (W) if its risk-neutral performance, the Jensen’s Alpha, for 
the given year is higher than or equal to the median of alphas for the given year and 
geographical region. Consequently a fund is categorised as a loser (L) if its risk-neutral 
performance for the given year and geographical region is lower than the median. Looking for 
evidence of one-year persistence in performance the evidence of persistence is strengthened if 
the fund in question is categorised as either a winner for two consecutive years (WW) or a 
loser for two consecutive years (LL). The evidence of persistence is thus weakened if the fund 
is categorised as a winner and then a loser the following year (WL) or a loser and then a 
winner the following year (LW). 
From the four categories mentioned above one do calculate the cross product ratio (CPR) for 
every two consecutive years and each geographical region as follows 
𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 (𝐶𝑃𝑅) = 𝑁𝑊𝑊 ×  𝑁𝐿𝐿
𝑁𝑊𝐿 ×  𝑁𝐿𝑊 
where  
NWW is the number of funds categorised as winners for the two consecutive years in question,  
NLL is the number of funds categorised as losers for the two consecutive years in question,  
NWL is the number of funds categorised as winners the first year and losers the second year 
and 
NLW is the number of funds categorised as losers the first year and winners the second year. 
If the number of funds classified as WW or LL is equally high as the number classified as WL 
or LW there is no evidence of persistence and the cross product ratio will be equal to one. A 
cross product ratio higher than one indicates that there is persistence (the higher the share of 
funds in a given time period that are classified as either WW or LL the stronger the evidence 
of persistence becomes). A cross product ratio lower than one point towards a negative 
relationship between the performance in the two periods (the higher the share of funds that are 
categorised as either WL or LW the stronger the evidence of a negative relationship 
becomes). 
11 
 
Besides testing for performance persistence for every year we also test for the full period. In 
order to calculate the CPR statistic for the full period we summarize the number of 
observations in each category (WW, LL, WL and LW) for all years and then calculate CPR 
statistic in the usual manner explained above.  
In order to test the significance of the cross product ratio we calculate two different statistics, 
one Z-statistic and one χ2 – statistic. The Z-statistic is calculated as follows 
𝑍 = 𝐶𝑃𝑅
σln(𝐶𝑃𝑅) 
where σln(CPR) is calculated as follows 
𝜎ln(𝐶𝑃𝑅) = � 1𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 1𝑁𝐿𝐿 + 1𝑁𝑊𝐿 + 1𝑁𝐿𝑊. 
As with Z-statistics in general we assume it to follow a normal distribution. A test of the 
normality assumption is provided in table C2 in the appendix.  Given a 5 per cent significance 
level a Z-statistic larger than 1.96 implies that the cross product ratio is significantly larger 
than 1. This implies evidence of performance persistence for the given year(s). 
As mentioned above we have also decided to compute a second statistic, namely a χ2 – 
statistic. This is due to the fact that our dataset suffers from survivorship bias. Carpenter and 
Lynch (1999) have argued that the results emerging from the calculation of the χ2 – statistic 
are more robust to survivorship bias. The χ2 – statistic is calculated as follows 
𝜒2 = ∑(𝑂𝑖 + 𝐸𝑖)2
𝐸𝑖
 
where Oi denotes the observed frequencies and Ei the expected frequencies of the four 
categories.   
In more detail the χ2 – statistic is calculated as follows (Garbalinska and Gustafsson, 2007): 
𝜒2 = (𝑁𝑊𝑊 − 𝐷1)2
𝐷1 + (𝑁𝑊𝐿 − 𝐷2)2𝐷2 + (𝑁𝐿𝑊 − 𝐷3)2𝐷3 + (𝑁𝐿𝐿 − 𝐷4)2𝐷4  
where 
𝐷1 = (𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝐿) × 𝑁𝑊𝑊+𝑁𝐿𝑊𝑁 , 
𝐷2 = (𝑁𝑊𝑊 + 𝑁𝑊𝐿) × 𝑁𝑊𝑊+𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑁 , 
𝐷3 = (𝑁𝐿𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝑁𝑊𝑊+𝑁𝐿𝑊𝑁 , 
𝐷4 = (𝑁𝐿𝑊 + 𝑁𝐿𝐿) × 𝑁𝑊𝐿+𝑁𝐿𝐿𝑁   
and N denotes the total number of funds. 
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Given a one degree of freedom, a test statistic above 3.84 points toward the existence of 
performance persistence. 
In order to calculate the Z-statistic observations in all categories (WW, LL, WL and LW) are 
needed. For the periods where no observations are categorized as WL or LW one can argue 
that these periods should be noted as positive since the statistical value is in fact infinitely 
positive(1
0
→ ∞). 
In order to note a significant 𝜒2-value we also need a positive Z-statistic. The reason for this 
is that if the Z-statistic is negative this points toward reversed performance persistence, i.e. a 
winning fund in one period is expected to lose in the next one. 
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5 Data 
We retrieved the necessary data from Morningstar Direct, a database available at the School 
of Business, Economics and Law at the Gothenburg University. Morningstar Direct claims 
that their database is free from survivorship bias. However, we were not able to retrieve any 
data from dead funds, rendering our dataset with only surviving funds. 
In choice of frequency of return data we have followed previous studies by Dahlquist et al 
(2000) and Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) and chosen weekly returns. We reject daily 
returns as these might be subject to inappropriate noise, and longer frequencies as we believe 
fund managers evaluate their holdings more often. We do not necessarily believe they change 
their holdings from week to week, but if we would have chosen longer return frequencies the 
characteristics of a fund may change, leaving comparison inappropriate. As we have chosen 
weekly returns, we have also chosen the one week risk-free rate. 
We have collected data on 214 Sweden based equity funds. These funds have been divided 
into seven subcategories based on the geographical region they invest in. The reason for 
dividing the funds according to region is that we need an accurate performance measure for 
each year and fund. There is not one benchmark that is appropriate for all funds. The volatility 
and developments of markets differs, why it is hard to find a benchmark appropriate for all 
funds. For this reason we have also divided the funds investing in Sweden into two different 
subcategories, one includes funds investing in small cap stock and one is excluding. We 
believe small cap stocks are subject to different risks that are not reflected in our benchmark, 
for this reason we believe the results will differ. The alphas of small cap funds will in general 
be overvalued since the market risk is the only one present in our model and, as stated, these 
funds are subjected to different risks. We have defined funds as being Sweden based if their 
domicile is Sweden. 
As we in this study have chosen to only test for one year persistence, and not shorter time 
periods, we have excluded funds with less than two years of data. We have also excluded 
funds that are heavily invested in a specific sector. The reason to exclude these funds, as 
stated by Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007), is that a different benchmark would be needed 
for these funds. For the same reason we have excluded funds that invest in a single country, 
with Sweden being the exception. 
The return data on the funds are their weekly net asset value (NAV). We used these NAV’s to 
calculate the weekly log-returns for each fund as: 
𝑅𝑡 = 𝑙𝑛 � 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡−1� 
For calculation of the risk-adjusted returns we needed both benchmarks and a risk-free rate. 
The benchmarks were collected from the Datastream database while the risk-free rate was 
collected from Riksbanken, the Swedish central bank. The MSCI benchmark for each region 
was used as market proxy, and the one-week risk-free rate, the STIBOR (Stockholm Interbank 
Offered Rate) was used as risk-free rate. 
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Regions and their respective benchmark index 
Region Benchmark 
Sweden (for both ex. and incl. small cap)  MSCI Sweden 
Europe MSCI Europe 
Global MSCI World 
Asia (excluding Japan) MSCI Pacific (not including Japan) 
North America MSCI North America 
Global Emerging Markets MSCI Emerging Markets 
Europe Emerging Markets MSCI Emerging Markets Eastern Europe 
 
Table 4.1. In this table the different geographical regions with its respective benchmark are listed. 
When calculating Jensen’s Alphas for funds investing in Sweden we used MSCI Sweden as 
benchmark, for funds investing in Europe we use MSCI Europe etc. (see table 4.1). In contrast 
to the benchmarks, the only risk free rate needed was the STIBOR risk-free rate. The reason 
for this is that all funds are based in Sweden. 
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6 Results of Tests 
6.1 Autoregression Results 
The normality assumption made for the regressions is of great importance to the 
trustworthiness of the autoregression results. If the normality assumption fails the significant 
tests of the coefficients become invalid. As seen in figure 5.1.1 below many of the residuals in 
each subperiod in each category are either not tested due to too few observations or are failing 
the test. Though one should take into account the test is oversensitive and may reject a 
distribution that on graphical inspection is not problematic. We have however not been able to 
confirm the normality of the residuals on graphical inspection. Since our uncertainty about the 
distribution of the regression residuals is still substantial it makes us believe that the results 
from the non-parametric tests are more reliable. Nevertheless we have chosen to present the 
results from the autoregressions. 
The full results from the autoregressions are all presented in the tables in appendix A. A 
summary of the results is presented in table 5.1.1 below. Significant results are found for at 
least one subperiod for all categories. The most prevalent persistence is found for the Sweden 
Incl Small Cap, Sweden Ex Small Cap and Europe categories and to some extent also for the 
Global category. The main significant results are found in 2001-2006 and to some extent also 
in 2009-2010 and 1994-1997. 
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Figure 5.1.1. Share of subperiods in each category that fail, pass and are not tested. 
Summary of normality test results 1 
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Summary of regression results 
 Sweden 
Incl 
Small 
Cap 
Sweden 
Ex 
Small 
Cap 
Europe Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
Global Global 
Emerging 
Markets 
North 
America 
Asia 
1992-
1993 
-0.776 
(0.016) 
-0.0887 
(0.647) 
9.963 
(0.588) 
- -0.713 
(0.176) 
- - 0.536 
(0.477) 
1993-
1994 
0.329* 
(0.002) 
0.126 
(0.612) 
-0.0224 
(0.935) 
- 0.634 
(0.094) 
- - 0.285 
(0.569) 
1994-
1995 
0.0207 
(0.896) 
-0.0720 
(0.494) 
0.537 
(0.135) 
- 1.070* 
(0.000) 
- - -0.805 
(0.460) 
1995-
1996 
0.636 
(0.162) 
0.671* 
(0.039) 
-0.392 
(0.421) 
- 0.437 
(0.096) 
- 0.118 
(0.905) 
-0.168 
(0.815) 
1996-
1997 
0.652* 
(0.000) 
0.542* 
(0.028) 
-0.336 
(0.443) 
- -0.174 
(0.106) 
- 0.859 
(0.058) 
0.855* 
(0.019) 
1997-
1998 
-1.075 
(0.001) 
-0.945 
(0.044) 
-0.696 
(0.226) 
- 0.168 
(0.783) 
- -0.619 
(0.268) 
-0.191 
(0.371) 
1998-
1999 
-0.345 
(0.002) 
-0.276 
(0.010) 
-0.0186 
(0.898) 
0.444 
(0.759) 
0.369 
(0.208) 
2.127 
(0.131) 
-1.828 
(0.178) 
0.899 
(0.430) 
1999-
2000 
0.327 
(0.084) 
0.250 
(0.327) 
0.365 
(0.240) 
-0.222 
(0.406) 
0.0555 
(0.756) 
0.110 
(0.682) 
-0.781 
(0.028) 
0.575 
(0.192) 
2000-
2001 
-0.149 
(0.225) 
0.156 
(0.096) 
0.667* 
(0.001) 
0.508 
(0.170) 
0.258* 
(0.016) 
1.142 
(0.457) 
-0.286 
(0.384) 
-0.176 
(0.106) 
2001-
2002 
0.327* 
(0.000) 
0.563* 
(0.000) 
0.627* 
(0.000) 
0.996* 
(0.005) 
0.236 
(0.138) 
0.102 
(0.773) 
-0.411 
(0.433) 
1.003 
(0.070) 
2002-
2003 
0.0126 
(0.939) 
0.256* 
(0.006) 
-0.351 
(0.153) 
-0.0753 
(0.857) 
0.252 
(0.263) 
-0.244 
(0.698) 
-0.162 
(0.563) 
0.0252 
(0.876) 
2003-
2004 
0.417* 
(0.000) 
0.283 
(0.055) 
0.658* 
(0.000) 
1.198* 
(0.012) 
0.733* 
(0.000) 
-0.730 
(0.557) 
0.391 
(0.123) 
-2.009 
(0.398) 
2004-
2005 
0.653* 
(0.000) 
-0.287 
(0.037) 
0.661* 
(0.000) 
1.217* 
(0.028) 
0.441* 
(0.001) 
0.100 
(0.648) 
1.292 
(0.401) 
-0.443 
(0.290) 
2005-
2006 
0.379* 
(0.000) 
0.122 
(0.404) 
0.934* 
(0.000) 
0.0171 
(0.878) 
0.712* 
(0.000) 
0.702 
(0.674) 
-0.0467 
(0.804) 
-0.0724 
(0.671) 
2006-
2007 
-0.169 
(0.070) 
0.143 
(0.220) 
-0.478 
(0.005) 
-0.701 
(0.077) 
0.138 
(0.210) 
-0.00829 
(0.993) 
-0.00292 
(0.996) 
-0.412 
(0.541) 
2007-
2008 
0.700* 
(0.003) 
-0.551 
(0.019) 
1.161* 
(0.007) 
-4.143 
(0.104) 
-0.426 
(0.105) 
-0.824 
(0.331) 
2.226* 
(0.015) 
-2.180 
(0.001) 
2008-
2009 
-0.578 
(0.000) 
0.227 
(0.246) 
-0.232 
(0.106) 
-0.265 
(0.164) 
-0.324 
(0.000) 
-0.172 
(0.495) 
-1.423 
(0.025) 
0.0283 
(0.903) 
2009-
2010 
0.260* 
(0.000) 
0.234* 
(0.000) 
0.899* 
(0.000) 
0.248 
(0.089) 
0.515* 
(0.000) 
0.213* 
(0.036) 
0.602 
(0.125) 
0.211 
(0.074) 
2010-
2011 
-0.143 
(0.134) 
-0.236 
(0.039) 
-0.162 
(0.127) 
-0.622 
(0.402) 
-0.416 
(0.013) 
0.293 
(0.472) 
-0.133 
(0.656) 
-0.542 
(0.422) 
Full 
Period 
-0.016 
(0.604) 
0.024 
(0.498) 
0.152* 
(0.005) 
-.097 
(0.416) 
0.004 
(0.919) 
-0.116 
(0.175) 
0.383* 
(0.000) 
-0.313 
(0.000) 
Table 5.1.1. In the above table the autoregression results are presented. The value of the coefficient and its 
corresponding p-value (parentheses) is presented for every subperiod for  every category. Significant results are 
marked by an asterisk. Subperiods with no data available are marked with a hyphen. 
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Regression result for 03/04 for the category Sweden incl. small cap 
Figure 5.1.1. Regression results for Sweden incl. small cap category for the years 2003/2004. 
 
Regression result for 07/08 for the category Sweden incl. small cap 
 Figure 5.1.3. Regression results for Sweden incl. small cap category for the years 2007/2008. 
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In figure 5.1.2 and 5.1.3 the regressions for the years 2003/2004 and 2007/2008 respectively, 
for the category Sweden incl small cap, are shown. On the y-axis one can read the values of 
the alphas for the dependent year and on the x-axis the values of the alphas the lagged year. 
Both graphs represent periods with positive betas that are statistically significant. Looking at 
the periods that are statistically significant one can separate the periods that just show 
performance persistence and periods that indicate the possibility of outperforming the market. 
As seen in table 5.1.2 below the greatest difference compared to the earlier output from the 
regressions can be seen in the results from Europe. For this category we have seven periods 
with statistically significant positive betas. However, only in two of these periods we can find 
indications of funds consistently outperforming the market.  
Analysis of regression results 
 Sweden 
Incl 
Small 
Cap 
Sweden 
Ex 
Small 
Cap 
Europe Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
Global Global 
Emerging 
Markets 
North 
America 
Asia 
1992-1993    -  -   
1993-1994 •   -  -   
1994-1995    - × -   
1995-1996  •  -  -   
1996-1997 • ○  -  -  × 
1997-1998         
1998-1999         
1999-2000         
2000-2001   ×  ×    
2001-2002 • • × ×     
2002-2003  ○       
2003-2004 •  ○ • •    
2004-2005 •  × • •    
2005-2006 •  •  •    
2006-2007         
2007-2008 ×  ×    ×  
2008-2009         
2009-2010 • • •  • •   
2010-2011         
Table 5.1.2. In this table all subperiods with significant performance persistence are marked with a dot. A black 
dot represents periods where funds show that the possibility of outperforming the market, the crosses represent 
periods where funds do not outperform the market, and rings represent periods with small tendencies of the 
possibility of outperforming the market. Subperiods with no data available are marked with a hyphen. 
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Proportion of significant subperiods 
 Sweden 
Incl Small 
Cap 
Sweden 
Ex Small 
Cap 
Europe Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
Global Global 
Emerging 
Markets 
North 
America 
Asia 
Significant 
subperiods 
42.11% 
(36.84%) 
26.32% 
(15.79%) 
36.84% 
(10.53%) 
23.08% 
(15.38%) 
31.58% 
(21.05%) 
7.69% 
(7.69%) 
5.26% 
(0%) 
5.26% 
(0%) 
Significant 
subperiods 
(N < 8 
excluded) 
42.11% 
(36.84%) 
26.32% 
(15.79%) 
43.75% 
(12.50%) 
- 31.25% 
(25.00%) 
33.33% 
(33.33%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
Number of 
subperiods  
N ≥ 8 
19 19 16 0 16 3 1 4 
Table 5.1.2. In the above table the proportion of significant periods are shown for each category. The number in 
parenthesis denotes the proportion of periods that show tendencies of the possibility to outperform the market. In 
the row “Significant subperiods (N < 8 excluded)” only periods with eight observations or more or counted, and 
in the row “Number of subperiods N ≥ 8” the number of subperiods with eight observations or more are 
presented. 
In table 5.1.2 the proportion of significant subperiods for each category can be read. Also the 
number of subperiods with more than eight observations for each category is presented. The 
numbers presented are not associated with any direct analysis, i.e. a certain number does not 
have a certain interpretation. However, the numbers in the table can be used as an aid when 
looking at the extent of performance persistence for a certain category. Useful information in 
this table is that categories with more subperiods with a greater number of observations in 
general produce more subperiods that show evidence of performance persistence. This 
indicates that a potential reason for the few significant results in the other categories is due to 
the lack of observations. 
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6.2 Cross Product Ratio Test Results 
The full results from the cross product ratio tests are in all presented in tables in appendix B. 
A summary of those results are presented in table 5.2.1 below. The cross product ratio test 
results confirm the results from the autoregression to a large extent finding prevalent evidence 
of performance persistence for the Sweden Incl Small Cap, Sweden Ex Small Cap, Europe and 
Global categories.  
The evidence for the Europe category is somewhat different compared to the autoregression.  
Significant results are found for fewer years compared to the autoregression. On the other the 
hand significant persistence for the full period is found using the cross product ratio test.  
For all subperiods with significant results according z-statistic we have also found significant 
persistence according to the Chi-Square statistic. This may imply that the survivorship bias is 
not that problematic taking into account that the chi square has been argued to be more robust 
to survivorship bias.   
21 
 
Summary of cross product ratio test results 
 Sweden 
Incl Small 
Cap 
Sweden 
Ex Small 
Cap 
Europe Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
Global Global 
Emerging 
Markets 
North 
America 
Asia 
1992-
1993 
-1.47 
(2.396) 
0.299 
(0.09) 
N/A 
(3) 
- -0.8 
(0.667) 
- N/A 
(2) 
N/A 
1993-
1994 
0.331 
(0.11) 
1.022 
(1.103) 
N/A 
(3) 
- N/A 
(6*) 
- N/A 
(2) 
0 
(0) 
1994-
1995 
-1.337 
(1.887) 
-1.754 
(3.6) 
N/A 
(0.75) 
- N/A 
(7*) 
- N/A 
(2) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
1995-
1996 
1.073 
(1.173) 
1.549 
(2.571) 
0.299 
(0.09) 
- 1.914 
(4.412*) 
- 0 
(0) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
1996-
1997 
3.136 
(12.462) 
2.055* 
(4.735*) 
-1.47 
(2.396) 
- -1.549 
(2.571) 
- N/A 
(4*) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
1997-
1998 
-3.238 
(12.5) 
-2.049 
(4.545) 
1.47 
(2.396) 
N/A 
(2) 
0.533 
(0.286) 
N/A 
(2) 
N/A 
(2.222) 
N/A 
1998-
1999 
-3.278 
(12.655) 
-1.43 
(2.112) 
0.873 
(0.782) 
0 
(0) 
-0.989 
(1) 
N/A 
(3) 
N/A 
(5) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
1999-
2000 
2.456* 
(6.4*) 
-0.2 
(0.04) 
2.211* 
(6.198*) 
0 
(0) 
-0.675 
(0.46) 
0 
(0) 
N/A 
(5) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
2000-
2001 
-0.283 
(0.08) 
0.665 
(0.444) 
0.989 
(1) 
N/A 
(4*) 
1.326 
(1.801) 
0 
(0) 
-0.371 
(0.139) 
-0.438 
(0.194) 
2001-
2002 
3.098* 
(10.286*) 
3.109* 
(10.744*) 
2.344* 
(6.343*) 
N/A 
(4*) 
0 
(0) 
0 
(0) 
-0.371 
(0.139) 
N/A 
(3.938*) 
2002-
2003 
1.705 
(2.959) 
1.528 
(2.381) 
1.073 
(1.173) 
0 
(0) 
0.848 
(0.724) 
N/A 
(4) 
N/A 
(2.222) 
0.438 
(0.194) 
2003-
2004 
3.332* 
(11.972*) 
1.786 
(3.273) 
1.263 
(1.636) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
2.795* 
(8.526*) 
0 
(0) 
-0.371 
(0.139) 
-1.064 
(1.215) 
2004-
2005 
2.555* 
(6.778*) 
-0.149 
(0.022) 
2.721* 
(8.909*) 
-0.371 
(0.139) 
1.256 
(1.6) 
N/A 
(4*) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
1.064 
(1.215) 
2005-
2006 
4.273* 
(20.629*) 
2.264* 
(5.333*)* 
1.263 
(1.636) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
2.118* 
(4.667*) 
0 
(0) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
-1.064 
(1.215) 
2006-
2007 
-0.697 
(0.486) 
0 
(0) 
-2.049 
(4.545) 
-0.8 
(0.667) 
-1.33 
(1.793) 
0.371 
(0.139) 
-0.371 
(0.139) 
-0.438 
(0.194) 
2007-
2008 
0 
(0) 
-1.591 
(2.571) 
2.721* 
(8.909*) 
N/A 
(6) 
0.434 
(0.189) 
N/A 
(3.938) 
N/A 
(2.222) 
0 
(0) 
2008-
2009 
-1.62 
(2.652) 
0.653 
(0.427) 
-1.753 
(3.222) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
-2.264 
(5.333) 
-0.628 
(0.4) 
0.241 
(0.058) 
0 
(0) 
2009-
2010 
3.502* 
(12.89*) 
0.374 
(0.14) 
2.768 
(9.077) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
3.792* 
(16.525*
 
0.849 
(0.737) 
N/A 
(2.1) 
1.022 
(1.103) 
2010-
2011 
0.4 
(0.16) 
-1.079 
(1.171) 
-1.166 
(1.385) 
0.8 
(0.667) 
-2.858 
(8.654) 
-0.257 
(0.066) 
-1.346 
(2) 
0.299 
(0.09) 
Full 
Period 
4.072* 
(16.676*) 
1.674 
(2.806) 
3.96* 
(15.969*
 
1.092 
(1.2) 
1.869 
(3.5) 
-0.34 
(0.115) 
-1.359 
(1.861) 
0.801 
(0.643) 
Table 5.2.1. In the above table a summary of the cross product ratio results are presented . The value and the p-
value (parentheses). Significant results are marked by an asterisk.. Subperiods with no data available are 
marked with a hyphen. 
22 
 
Proportion of significant subperiods 
 Sweden 
Incl Small 
Cap 
Sweden 
Ex Small 
Cap 
Europe Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
Global Global 
Emerging 
Markets 
North 
America 
Asia 
Significant 
subperiods 
31.58% 
(31.58%) 
15.79% 
(15.79%) 
21.05% 
(21.05%) 
0% 
(15.38%) 
15.79% 
(31.58%) 
0% 
(7.69%) 
0% 
(5.26%) 
0% 
(5.26%) 
N < 8 excl. 31.58% 
(31.58%) 
15.79% 
(15.79%) 
25.00% 
(25.00%) 
- 18.75% 
(25.00%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
0% 
(0%) 
Number of 
subperiods  
N ≥ 8 
19 19 16 0 16 3 1 4 
 
Table 5.2.2. In the above table the proportion of significant periods is shown for each category. The first number 
denotes the proportion of significant Z-values, and the number in parenthesis denotes the proportion of periods 
with significant 𝜒2-values. In the row “N < 8 excl.” only periods with eight observations or more or counted, 
and in the row “Number of subperiods N ≥ 8” the number of subperiods with eight observations or more are 
presented. 
In table 5.2.2 the proportion of significant subperiods for each category can be read. Also the 
number of subperiods with more than eight observations for each category is presented. The 
numbers presented are not associated with any direct analysis, i.e. a certain number does not 
have a certain interpretation. However, the numbers in the table can be used as an aid when 
looking at the extent of performance persistence for a certain category. Useful information in 
this table is that categories with more subperiods with a greater number of observations in 
general produce more subperiods that show evidence of performance persistence. This 
indicates that a potential reason for the few significant results in the other categories is due to 
the lack of observations. 
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7 Analysis 
The results presented in the previous section show evidence of existing performance 
persistence for several regions and both for subperiods and several full periods. Even though 
it is easy to conclude that performance persistence exists on the Swedish market it is 
somewhat harder to conclude what determinants that explain this persistence. 
Firstly, the performance persistence seems to be more prevalent for the Sweden Incl Small 
Cap category compared to the Sweden ex. Small Cap category. This could possibly be 
explained by that our benchmark, the MSCI Sweden, doesn’t incorporate all the risk a small 
cap stock is subject to and consequently inflate the value of the Jensen’s Alpha. A fund 
investing more in small cap compared to its benchmark will thus be a constant over-performer 
and therefore show signs of persistence even though it is a false alarm. An example of such an 
increased risk which small cap stocks are subject to in comparison to a large cap stocks is the 
risk for the company to fail and go bankrupt. 
Besides the technical explanation of a bad choice of benchmark, the persistency found for the 
Sweden Incl Small Cap category could also be attributed to issues of inefficiency. Small cap 
stocks are usually not analysed to the same extent as large cap stocks (Arbel and Strebel, 
1983) with the result of less publicly available information about small stocks. It might, thus, 
be easier to achieve positive abnormal returns analysing small cap stocks compared to large 
cap stocks. This may end up with a larger discrepancy in risk-neutral returns between funds 
which may then drive the performance persistence seen. 
A higher discrepancy in risk-neutral returns between funds may also lead to a larger 
survivorship bias because it then becomes clearer which funds that are not performing very 
well. 
Secondly, the general performance persistence found could be explained by market 
inefficiencies where some investors do have an informational advantage and thus perform 
better. The market inefficiency makes it possible for investors to beat the market. The greater 
the inefficiency is on the market the greater is the performance persistence. But to what extent 
is this true? 
Both the European (Borges, 2010) and the North American (Chan, Gup and Pan, 2003) 
markets are considered to be fairly efficient but our results show that the persistence is much 
greater for the European and Swedish market compared to the North American one. Our 
results for the North American market should be taken with a pinch of salt however, due to 
the low number of observations and the fairly low value on goodness-of-fit measure for 
CAPM regression. Though the results of Garbalinska and Gustafsson (2007) gives support 
that there is no existing performance persistence for funds investing in North America. Given 
that both the European and North American market are both considered fairly efficient 
markets, according to efficient market hypothesis, no prevalent performance persistence 
should be found for the two markets. Could though the difference in performance persistence 
be explained by a difference in fund managers’ ability to exploit the inefficiency? The ability 
to exploit inefficiencies may be all down to the individual fund managers’ knowledge of the 
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market. It seems somewhat likely that Swedish fund managers of funds investing in Sweden 
and Europe are t well-informed about the Swedish market and to some extent also the 
European market given the close geographical and economical connections between Sweden 
and Europe. This argument intuitively seems stronger for small cap stocks since information 
is not available to the same extent as for large cup stocks.  The difference in knowledge 
between the Swedish and European market and the North American one could thus explain 
the difference in performance persistence. 
Following the same argument Swedish fund managers would have an informational 
disadvantage when it comes to Asian market compared to Asian fund managers. 
Thirdly, the number of observations is vital to how strong conclusions one can draw from the 
results.  For the early years and for the Asia, North America, Global Emerging Markets and 
Europe Emerging Markets categories in general the number of observations is fairly small. 
This limits how strong conclusions one can draw about the possible performance persistence. 
The nature of the cross product ratio test also adds to this uncertainty. The cross product ratio 
test is sensitive to the number of observations and is more likely to sign for significant results 
the higher the number of observations is. 
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8 Conclusions 
The object of this thesis was to determine whether performance persistence exists on the 
Swedish market for equity mutual funds or not. We expected to find performance persistence 
since similar previous studies on the Swedish market find such evidence. We performed both 
a parametric and a non-parametric test testing for one-year persistence of the risk-neutral 
returns. The reason for including a non-parametric test was that we had problems with the 
normality assumptions.  
In order to calculate valid risk-neutral returns the he dataset was divided into eight categories 
depending on the funds choice of geographical investment region. The reason for dividing the 
funds accordingly is that suitable benchmarks are available for geographical investment 
regions. 
The thesis is based on the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis. If performance 
persistence exists the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis can be rejected since 
prices then do not reflect historical returns. If the performance persistence found is derived 
from funds constantly under-performing, relative to its index in risk-neutral terms, we can 
make an alternative interpretation of the efficient market hypothesis and conclude that the 
market is efficient for rational investors. 
The results confirm the existence of performance persistence on the Swedish market. 
Prevalent performance persistence is found for funds investing in Sweden, Europe and 
globally. Thus the weak form of the efficient market hypothesis is rejected for those markets. 
We find strong evidence that those markets are not efficient for all investors’, however we 
find weak evidence of those markets not being efficient for rational investors. 
From an investors point of view we have strong evidence of the existence of funds that 
constantly underperform and weak evidence of the existence of funds that constantly 
overperform, i.e. we have strong evidence of the existence of funds investors should avoid 
and weak evidence of the existence of funds investors should invest in. 
To conclude, for investors investing in funds investing in Sweden, Europe and globally, from 
the year 2000 to 2010, avoiding funds that underperformed the previous year should be 
considered a valid investment criteria even though it should not be the only one. 
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Appendix A: Detailed Tables of Regression Results 
Sweden 
Incl Small Cap 
Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1992-1993 -0.776 0.016 0.490 0.416 0.710 0.647 11 
1993-1994 0.329* 0.002 0.680 0.012 0.015 0.009 11 
1994-1995 0.0207 0.896 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 13 
1995-1996 0.636 0.162 0.100 0.004 0.078 0.010 21 
1996-1997 0.652* 0.000 0.777 0.881 0.544 0.818 26 
1997-1998 -1.075 0.001 0.328 0.040 0.099 0.041 32 
1998-1999 -0.345 0.002 0.265 0.000 0.001 0.000 35 
1999-2000 0.327 0.084 0.076 0.878 0.087 0.206 40 
2000-2001 -0.149 0.225 0.030 0.280 0.004 0.016 50 
2001-2002 0.327* 0.000 0.232 0.246 0.290 0.274 56 
2002-2003 0.0126 0.939 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.003 57 
2003-2004 0.417* 0.000 0.405 0.523 0.007 0.030 61 
2004-2005 0.653* 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.013 0.000 65 
2005-2006 0.379* 0.000 0.244 0.001 0.001 0.000 70 
2006-2007 -0.169 0.070 0.045 0.000 0.007 0.000 74 
2007-2008 0.700* 0.003 0.107 0.037 0.004 0.005 80 
2008-2009 -0.578 0.000 0.160 0.020 0.000 0.000 85 
2009-2010 0.260* 0.000 0.450 0.003 0.013 0.002 95 
2010-2011 -0.143 0.134 0.023 0.000 0.001 0.000 100 
Full Period -0.016 0.604 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Table A1. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
Sweden 
Ex. Small Cap 
Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1992-1993 -0.089 0.647 0.032 0.361 0.860 0.623 9 
1993-1994 0.126 0.612 0.039 0.222 0.257 0.185 9 
1994-1995 -0.072 0.494 0.060 0.981 0.776 0.960 10 
1995-1996 0.671* 0.039 0.310 0.017 0.037 0.016 14 
1996-1997 0.542* 0.028 0.283 0.725 0.863 0.926 17 
1997-1998 -0.945 0.044 0.188 0.157 0.035 0.050 22 
1998-1999 -0.276 0.010 0.278 0.082 0.173 0.087 23 
1999-2000 0.250 0.327 0.039 0.811 0.363 0.625 27 
2000-2001 0.156 0.096 0.079 0.303 0.278 0.300 36 
2001-2002 0.563* 0.000 0.299 0.873 0.165 0.353 41 
2002-2003 0.256* 0.006 0.175 0.029 0.006 0.006 42 
2003-2004 0.283 0.055 0.085 0.007 0.008 0.003 44 
2004-2005 -0.287 0.037 0.093 0.008 0.123 0.017 47 
2005-2006 0.122 0.404 0.015 0.009 0.021 0.007 48 
2006-2007 0.143 0.220 0.030 0.001 0.002 0.000 52 
2007-2008 -0.551 0.019 0.097 0.071 0.081 0.052 56 
2008-2009 0.227 0.246 0.024 0.000 0.000 0.000 59 
2009-2010 0.234* 0.000 0.214 0.000 0.005 0.000 65 
2010-2011 -0.236 0.039 0.062 0.000 0.001 0.000 69 
Full Period 0.024 0.498 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Table A2. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Europe Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1992-1993 9.963 0.588 0.363 - - - 3 
1993-1994 -0.022 0.935 0.010 - - - 3 
1994-1995 0.537 0.135 0.956 - - - 3 
1995-1996 -0.392 0.421 0.094 0.751 0.446 0.697 9 
1996-1997 -0.336 0.443 0.067 0.010 0.013 0.008 11 
1997-1998 -0.696 0.226 0.158 0.237 0.481 0.328 11 
1998-1999 -0.019 0.898 0.002 0.533 0.294 0.423 11 
1999-2000 0.365 0.240 0.123 0.372 0.327 0.361 13 
2000-2001 0.667* 0.001 0.534 0.154 0.953 0.311 16 
2001-2002 0.627* 0.000 0.539 0.394 0.214 0.276 19 
2002-2003 -0.351 0.153 0.105 0.591 0.090 0.168 21 
2003-2004 0.658* 0.000 0.658 0.833 0.582 0.838 22 
2004-2005 0.661* 0.000 0.695 0.695 0.269 0.469 22 
2005-2006 0.934* 0.000 0.679 0.724 0.937 0.937 22 
2006-2007 -0.478 0.005 0.329 0.659 0.303 0.503 22 
2007-2008 1.161* 0.007 0.310 0.182 0.402 0.248 22 
2008-2009 -0.232 0.106 0.110 0.072 0.947 0.164 25 
2009-2010 0.899* 0.000 0.644 0.587 0.135 0.245 25 
2010-2011 -0.162 0.127 0.094 0.926 0.127 0.276 26 
Full Period 0.152* 0.005 0.026 0.729 0.000 0.000  
Table A3. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
Europe 
Emerging Markets 
Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1998-1999 0.444 0.759 0.058 - - - 4 
1999-2000 -0.222 0.406 0.353 - - - 4 
2000-2001 0.508 0.170 0.688 - - - 4 
2001-2002 0.996* 0.005 0.990 - - - 4 
2002-2003 -0.075 0.857 0.021 - - - 4 
2003-2004 1.198* 0.012 0.908 - - - 5 
2004-2005 1.217* 0.028 0.842 - - - 5 
2005-2006 0.017 0.878 0.009 - - - 5 
2006-2007 -0.701 0.077 0.584 - - - 6 
2007-2008 -4.143 0.104 0.523 - - - 6 
2008-2009 -0.265 0.164 0.420 - - - 6 
2009-2010 0.248 0.089 0.556 - - - 6 
2010-2011 -0.622 0.402 0.180 - - - 6 
Full Period -0.097 0.416 0.010 0.001 0.001 0.000  
Table A4. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Global Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1992-1993 -0.713 0.176 0.403 - - - 6 
1993-1994 0.634 0.094 0.544 - - - 6 
1994-1995 1.070* 0.000 0.928 - - - 7 
1995-1996 0.437 0.096 0.277 0.033 0.209 0.059 11 
1996-1997 -0.174 0.106 0.203 0.994 0.878 0.988 14 
1997-1998 0.168 0.783 0.007 0.105 0.290 0.131 14 
1998-1999 0.369 0.208 0.110 0.903 0.585 0.855 16 
1999-2000 0.056 0.756 0.006 0.947 0.492 0.780 19 
2000-2001 0.258* 0.016 0.212 0.708 0.435 0.672 27 
2001-2002 0.236 0.138 0.072 0.933 0.284 0.541 32 
2002-2003 0.252 0.263 0.038 0.481 0.011 0.041 35 
2003-2004 0.733* 0.000 0.558 0.053 0.005 0.008 38 
2004-2005 0.441* 0.001 0.250 0.094 0.481 0.169 40 
2005-2006 0.712* 0.000 0.277 0.783 0.612 0.847 42 
2006-2007 0.138 0.210 0.036 0.001 0.000 0.000 45 
2007-2008 -0.426 0.105 0.057 0.009 0.111 0.017 47 
2008-2009 -0.324 0.000 0.253 0.210 0.631 0.387 48 
2009-2010 0.515* 0.000 0.500 0.953 0.084 0.205 51 
2010-2011 -0.416 0.013 0.108 0.000 0.001 0.000 56 
Full Period 0.004 0.919 0.000 0.828 0.000 0.000  
TableA5. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
 
Global 
Emerging Markets 
Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1998-1999 2.127 0.131 0.958 - - - 3 
1999-2000 0.110 0.682 0.101 - - - 4 
2000-2001 1.142 0.457 0.295 - - - 4 
2001-2002 0.102 0.773 0.051 - - - 4 
2002-2003 -0.244 0.698 0.091 - - - 4 
2003-2004 -0.730 0.557 0.196 - - - 4 
2004-2005 0.100 0.648 0.124 - - - 4 
2005-2006 0.702 0.674 0.106 - - - 4 
2006-2007 -0.008 0.993 0.000 - - - 5 
2007-2008 -0.824 0.331 0.188 - - - 7 
2008-2009 -0.172 0.495 0.060 0.238 0.435 0.303 10 
2009-2010 0.213* 0.036 0.341 0.602 0.850 0.858 13 
2010-2011 0.293 0.472 0.048 0.978 0.109 0.218 13 
Full Period -0.116 0.175 0.023 0.332 0.365 0.403  
Table A6. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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North America Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1995-1996 0.118 0.905 0.009 - - - 4 
1996-1997 0.859 0.058 0.887 - - - 4 
1997-1998 -0.619 0.268 0.380 - - - 5 
1998-1999 -1.828 0.178 0.505 - - - 5 
1999-2000 -0.781 0.028 0.843 - - - 5 
2000-2001 -0.286 0.384 0.256 - - - 5 
2001-2002 -0.411 0.433 0.214 - - - 5 
2002-2003 -0.162 0.563 0.123 - - - 5 
2003-2004 0.391 0.123 0.602 - - - 5 
2004-2005 1.292 0.401 0.241 - - - 5 
2005-2006 -0.047 0.804 0.024 - - - 5 
2006-2007 -0.003 0.996 0.000 - - - 5 
2007-2008 2.226* 0.015 0.896 - - - 5 
2008-2009 -1.423 0.025 0.669 - - - 7 
2009-2010 0.602 0.125 0.404 - - - 7 
2010-2011 -0.133 0.656 0.035 0.018  0.085 0.032 8 
Full Period 0.383* 0.000 0.164 0.077 0.063 0.045  
Table A7. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
 
Asia Estimated β1 P-value R2 Skewness Kurtosis P-value No. of funds 
1992-1993 0.536 0.477 0.535 - - - 3 
1993-1994 0.285 0.569 0.186 - - - 4 
1994-1995 -0.805 0.460 0.192 - - - 5 
1995-1996 -0.168 0.815 0.015 - - - 6 
1996-1997 0.855* 0.019 0.783 - - - 6 
1997-1998 -0.191 0.371 0.202 - - - 6 
1998-1999 0.899 0.430 0.161 - - - 6 
1999-2000 0.575 0.192 0.380 - - - 6 
2000-2001 -0.176 0.106 0.436 - - - 7 
2001-2002 1.003 0.070 0.514 - - - 7 
2002-2003 0.025 0.876 0.005 - - - 7 
2003-2004 -2.009 0.398 0.146 - - - 7 
2004-2005 -0.443 0.290 0.219 - - - 7 
2005-2006 -0.072 0.671 0.039 - - - 7 
2006-2007 -0.412 0.541 0.079 - - - 7 
2007-2008 -2.180 0.001 0.838 0.069 0.157 0.082 8 
2008-2009 0.028 0.903 0.003 0.145 0.428 0.188 8 
2009-2010 0.211 0.074 0.386 0.338 0.345 0.342 9 
2010-2011 -0.542 0.422 0.094 0.720 0.633 0.843 9 
Full Period -0.313 0.000 0.102 0.001 0.028 0.002  
Table A8. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Appendix B: Detailed Tables of CPR Rest Results 
Table B1. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.   
  
Sweden 
Incl Small Cap 
WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 2 1 4 4 0.125 1.414 -1.470 2.396 11 
1993-1994 3 3 3 2 1.500 1.225 0.331 0.110 11 
1994-1995 2 2 5 4 0.200 1.204 -1.337 1.887 13 
1995-1996 7 6 4 4 2.625 0.900 1.073 1.173 21 
1996-1997 11 11 2 2 30.25 1.087 3.136* 12.462* 26 
1997-1998 3 3 13 13 0.053 0.906 -3.238 12.500 32 
1998-1999 4 3 14 14 0.061 0.852 -3.278 12.655 35 
1999-2000 14 14 6 6 5.444 0.690 2.456* 6.400* 40 
2000-2001 12 12 13 13 0.852 0.566 -0.283 0.080 50 
2001-2002 20 20 8 8 6.250 0.592 3.098* 10.286* 56 
2002-2003 18 17 11 11 2.529 0.544 1.705 2.959 57 
2003-2004 22 22 9 8 6.722 0.572 3.332* 11.972* 61 
2004-2005 22 21 11 11 3.818 0.524 2.555* 6.778* 65 
2005-2006 27 27 8 8 11.391 0.569 4.273* 20.629* 70 
2006-2007 17 17 20 20 0.723 0.467 -0.697 0.486 74 
2007-2008 20 20 20 20 1.000 0.447 0.000 0.000 80 
2008-2009 18 17 25 25 0.490 0.441 -1.620 2.652 85 
2009-2010 33 32 15 15 4.693 0.441 3.502* 12.890* 95 
2010-2011 26 26 24 24 1.174 0.400 0.340 0.160 100 
Full Period 281 274 215 212 1.689 0.129 4.072* 16.676*  
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Sweden 
Ex. Small Cap 
WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 3 2 2 2 1.500 1.354 0.299 0.090 9 
1993-1994 3 3 2 1 4.500 1.472 1.022 1.103 9 
1994-1995 1 1 4 4 0.063 1.581 -1.754 3.600 10 
1995-1996 5 5 2 2 6.250 1.183 1.549 2.571 14 
1996-1997 7 6 2 2 10.500 1.144 2.055* 4.735* 17 
1997-1998 3 3 8 8 0.141 0.957 -2.049 4.545 22 
1998-1999 4 4 8 7 0.286 0.876 -1.430 2.112 23 
1999-2000 7 6 7 7 0.857 0.772 -0.200 0.040 27 
2000-2001 10 10 8 8 1.563 0.671 0.665 0.444 36 
2001-2002 16 15 5 5 9.600 0.727 3.109* 10.744* 41 
2002-2003 13 13 8 8 2.641 0.635 1.528 2.381 42 
2003-2004 14 14 8 8 3.063 0.627 1.786 3.273 44 
2004-2005 12 11 12 12 0.917 0.584 -0.149 0.022 47 
2005-2006 16 16 8 8 4.000 0.612 2.264* 5.333* 48 
2006-2007 13 13 13 13 1.000 0.555 0.000 0.000 52 
2007-2008 11 11 17 17 0.419 0.547 -1.591 2.571 56 
2008-2009 16 16 14 13 1.407 0.523 0.653 0.427 59 
2009-2010 17 17 16 15 1.204 0.497 0.374 0.140 65 
2010-2011 15 15 20 19 0.592 0.486 -1.079 1.171 69 
Full Period 186 181 164 159 1.291 0.153 1.674 2.806 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table B2. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk. 
Europe WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 2 1 0 0 - -   - 3.000 3 
1993-1994 2 1 0 0 - -   - 3.000 3 
1994-1995 1 1 1 0 - -   - 0.750 3 
1995-1996 3 2 2 2 1.500 1.354 0.299 0.090 9 
1996-1997 2 1 4 4 0.125 1.414 -1.470 2.396 11 
1997-1998 4 4 2 1 8.000 1.414 1.470 2.396 11 
1998-1999 4 3 2 2 3.000 1.258 0.873 0.782 11 
1999-2000 6 5 1 1 30.000 1.538 2.211* 6.198* 13 
2000-2001 5 5 3 3 2.778 1.033 0.989 1.000 16 
2001-2002 8 7 2 2 14.000 1.126 2.344* 6.343* 19 
2002-2003 7 6 4 4 2.625 0.900 1.073 1.173 21 
2003-2004 7 7 4 4 3.063 0.886 1.263 1.636 22 
2004-2005 9 9 2 2 20.250 1.106 2.721* 8.909* 22 
2005-2006 7 7 4 4 3.063 0.886 1.263 1.636 22 
2006-2007 3 3 8 8 0.141 0.957 -2.049 4.545 22 
2007-2008 9 9 2 2 20.250 1.106 2.721* 8.909* 22 
2008-2009 4 4 9 8 0.222 0.858 -1.753 3.222 25 
2009-2010 10 10 3 2 16.667 1.017 2.768* 9.077* 25 
2010-2011 5 5 8 8 0.391 0.806 -1.166 1.385 26 
Full Period 98 90 61 57 2.537 0.235 3.960* 15.969*  
Table B3. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Europe 
Emerging 
Markets 
WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1997-1998 1 1 0 0 - - - 2.000 2 
1998-1999 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
1999-2000 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2000-2001 2 2 0 0  - - - 4.000* 4 
2001-2002 2 2 0 0  - - - 4.000* 4 
2002-2003 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2003-2004 2 1 1 1 2.000 1.871 0.371 0.139 5 
2004-2005 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.871 -0.371 0.139 5 
2005-2006 2 1 1 1 2.000 1.871 0.371 0.139 5 
2006-2007 1 1 2 2 0.250 1.732 -0.800 0.667 6 
2007-2008 0 0 3 3 0.000 - - 6.000 6 
2008-2009 2 2 1 1 4.000 1.732 0.800 0.667 6 
2009-2010 2 2 1 1 4.000 1.732 0.800 0.667 6 
2010-2011 2 2 1 1 4.000 1.732 0.800 0.667 6 
Full Period 20 18 15 14 1.714 0.494 1.092 1.200  
Table B4. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
Global WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 1 1 2 2 0.250 1.732 -0.800 0.667 6 
1993-1994 3 3 0 0 -  -   - 6.000 6 
1994-1995 4 3 0 0 -  -   - 7.000 7 
1995-1996 5 4 1 1 20.000 1.565 1.914* 4.412* 11 
1996-1997 2 2 5 5 0.160 1.183 -1.549 2.571 14 
1997-1998 4 4 3 3 1.778 1.080 0.533 0.286 14 
1998-1999 3 3 5 5 0.360 1.033 -0.989 1.000 16 
1999-2000 4 4 6 5 0.533 0.931 -0.675 0.460 19 
2000-2001 9 8 5 5 2.880 0.798 1.326 1.801 27 
2001-2002 8 8 8 8 1.000 0.707 0.000 0.000 32 
2002-2003 10 10 8 7 1.786 0.684 0.848 0.724 35 
2003-2004 14 14 5 5 7.840 0.737 2.795* 8.526* 38 
2004-2005 12 12 8 8 2.250 0.645 1.256 1.600 40 
2005-2006 14 14 7 7 4.000 0.655 2.118* 4.667* 42 
2006-2007 9 9 14 13 0.445 0.609 -1.330 1.793 45 
2007-2008 13 12 11 11 1.289 0.585 0.434 0.189 47 
2008-2009 8 8 16 16 0.250 0.612 -2.264 5.333 48 
2009-2010 20 20 6 5 13.333 0.683 3.792* 16.525* 51 
2010-2011 8 9 20 19 0.189 0.582 -2.858 8.654 56 
Full Period 151 148 130 125 1.375 0.171 1.869 3.500  
Table B5. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Global Emerging Markets WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1995-1996 1 0 0 0 - - - - 1 
1996-1997 0 0 1 0 - - - - 1 
1997-1998 0 0 1 1 0.000 - - 2.000 2 
1998-1999 2 1 0 0 - - - 3.000 3 
1999-2000 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2000-2001 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2001-2002 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2002-2003 0 0 2 2 0.000 - - 4.000 4 
2003-2004 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2004-2005 2 2 0 0 - - - 4.000* 4 
2005-2006 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
2006-2007 2 1 1 1 2.000 1.871 0.371 0.139 5 
2007-2008 1 0 3 3 0.000 - - 3.938 7 
2008-2009 2 2 3 3 0.444 1.291 -0.628 0.400 10 
2009-2010 4 4 3 2 2.667 1.155 0.849 0.737 13 
2010-2011 3 3 4 3 0.750 1.118 -0.257 0.066 13 
Full Period 22 18 23 20 0.861 0.441 -0.340 0.115  
Table B6. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
 
North America WW LL WL LW CPR σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 0 0 1 1 0.000 - - 2.000 2 
1993-1994 0 0 1 1 0.000 - - 2.000 2 
1994-1995 1 1 0 0 - - - 2.000 2 
1995-1996 1 1 1 1 1.000 2.000 0.000 0.000 4 
1996-1997 2 2 0 0 - - - 4.000* 4 
1997-1998 1 0 2 2 0.000 - - 2.222 5 
1998-1999 0 0 3 2 0.000 - - 5.000 5 
1999-2000 0 0 3 2 0.000 - - 5.000 5 
2000-2001 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.871 -0.371 0.139 5 
2001-2002 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.871 -0.371 0.139 5 
2002-2003 1 0 2 2 0.000 -  - 2.222 5 
2003-2004 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.871 -0.371 0.139 5 
2004-2005 2 1 1 1 2.000 1.871 0.371 0.139 5 
2005-2006 2 1 1 1 2.000 1.871 0.371 0.139 5 
2006-2007 1 1 2 1 0.500 1.871 -0.371 0.139 5 
2007-2008 2 2 1 0 - - - 2.222 5 
2008-2009 3 1 1 2 1.500 1.683 0.241 0.058 7 
2009-2010 3 2 2 0 - - - 2.100 7 
2010-2011 1 1 3 3 0.111 1.633 -1.346 2.000 8 
Full Period 23 16 30 22 0.558 0.430 -1.359 1.861  
Table B7. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
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Asia WW LL WL LW CPR Σ Z χ2 No. of funds 
1992-1993 1 1 1 0 - - - 0.750 3 
1993-1994 1 1 1 1 1,000 2,000 0,000 0.000 4 
1994-1995 1 2 1 1 2,000 1,871 0,371 0.139 5 
1995-1996 2 2 1 1 4,000 1,732 0,800 0.667 6 
1996-1997 2 2 1 1 4,000 1,732 0,800 0.667 6 
1997-1998 0 0 3 3 0,000 - - 6.000 6 
1998-1999 2 2 1 1 4,000 1,732 0,800 0.667 6 
1999-2000 2 2 1 1 4,000 1,732 0,800 0.667 6 
2000-2001 1 2 2 2 0,500 1,581 -0,438 0.194 7 
2001-2002 3 3 0 1 - - - 3.938* 7 
2002-2003 2 2 2 1 2,000 1,581 0,438 0.194 7 
2003-2004 1 1 2 3 0,167 1,683 -1,064 1.215 7 
2004-2005 3 2 1 1 6,000 1,683 1,064 1.215 7 
2005-2006 1 1 3 2 0,167 1,683 -1,064 1.215 7 
2006-2007 1 2 2 2 0,500 1,581 -0,438 0.194 7 
2007-2008 2 2 2 2 1,000 1,414 0,000 0.000 8 
2008-2009 2 2 2 2 1,000 1,414 0,000 0.000 8 
2009-2010 3 3 2 1 4,500 1,472 1,022 1.103 9 
2010-2011 2 3 2 2 1,500 1,354 0,299 0.090 9 
Full Period 32 35 30 28 1,333 0,359 0,801 0.643  
Table B8. Statistically significant betas are marked by an asterisk.  
Appendix C: Other Tables 
 Average R2 Per cent of Jensen’s Alphas´ being significant at 5% 
Sweden incl. small cap .817 6.496% 
Sweden ex. small cap .868  1.879% 
Europe .811  3.427% 
Europe emerging markets .850  27.586% 
Global .712  3.390% 
Global emerging markets .826  1.042% 
North America .426  5.319% 
Asia .712  0.752% 
Table C1. Average goodness-of-fit measures and per cent of the Jensen’s Alphas´ being significant for the 
CAPM regressions. 
No. of observations W V Z Prob>z 
123 0.991 0.873 -0.304 0.619 
Table C2. Results of the Shapiro-Wilk test for normality. 
 
